Introduction
Over the last several years, the hijackings and taking vessel is difficult to be protected by navy force in broad Somali waters. Lee(2011) proposed the establishment of special piracy tribunal, improvement of domestic law, authorized jurisdiction to captain of 'Chung-hae', and dispatched marine police to Korea navy. Realistically, militarization is difficult to be reflected in merchant ship (Kim, 2009 Many merchant vessels pass through those areas. 
Trends of Somali pirate attacks in 2011
Piracy in Somalia is changing into the business industry 
A vast area of jurisdictions
The broad expansion of activity region is one of the most advantageous conditions of pirates. As shown in Fig.4 , piracy appears even the 1,500 miles off shore in case of the Gulf of Aden and Somalia. Because of vast area, navy force is difficult to involve practically in piracy attack.
Patrolling of P-3C planes or unmanned aerial vehicle(UAV)
is effective solutions, but it is a burden in cost side. 
Securing safety of ship

Analysis of military cooperation and operation
The most efficient way to prevent the piracy is navigating with the escort of navy force. However, because of operational limitations, it is difficult to be escorted for all vessels navigating the Gulf of Aden and the Indian oceans.
In the past, coastal states near Malacca strait worked together and made agreements like 'ReCAAP' and 'Eye of the Sky' which resulted in drastic drop in number of piracy in Southeast Asia. Successful cases like 'ReCAAP' and 'Eye of the Sky' are needed to apply in Somali anti-piracy operations.
As shown in Table 2 In this study additionally suggested new POA based on the recent piracy status, direction and destination of vessel (refer to Fig. 7) . Navy force needs to recognize that many merchant vessels use general steady courses having own destinations. Periodical patrol along the main course will be more useful suggestion rather than own military policy.
Lynx and warship can be used in different situation. Other container ship also show its weak point (see Fig.   10 ). We need to know pirates try to occupy bridge in advance for hijacking. Duty officer should try to gain time, but existing countermeasures overlook this problem, and there is no protective system around bridge. Like the cases of double bottoms, which are significantly safer than single bottoms, it is necessary to make bulletproof windows or protective entrance door by SOLAS convention. There are many countermeasures for securing safety of merchant vessels, but it is not useful in reality. Some measures impose considerable financial burdens.
As pirates try to occupy bridge for hijacking, duty officer has to keep bridge with mentioned countermeasures such as bulletproof windows and doors. Present system is very weak by weapons, especially windows and entrance doors of bridge. In the long view, adjusting a pirate operation area (POA) of Korea navy is also effective measure in securing safety of merchant vessels.
Future research on countermeasures of piracy will include the assessment of bulletproof windows, protective entrance door.
